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Abstract 
It is axiomatic that lawyers have to be paid for their services. Regrettably, lawyers who 
represent money launderers may be offered dirty money, that is, proceeds of crime as fee 
payments by their clients. This essay explores the question of such tainted legal fees in 
South Africa through an analysis of its anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. It then 
compares the South African position to the approaches taken in the USA and Canada. 
South African AML legislation criminalises tainted fees. The USA amended its AML 
legislation to decriminalise tainted fees. And tainted fees never have been criminalised in 
Canada. The South African approach threatens both the right of accused persons to legal 
representation and the right of lawyers to practise their profession. It is recommended 
that the South African AML statutes be amended to decriminalise tainted legal fees. 
1 Introduction 
Money launderers regularly engage the services of legal practitioners, not only for 
criminal defence work, but also across a range of civil matters.1 Of course, lawyers have to 
be paid for their services. Regrettably, those who represent money launderers may find 
themselves in the invidious position of being offered dirty money2 in payment of their 
fees.3 Tainted fees invariably place the lawyer in an awkward position, both ethically and 
legally. The question is whether a lawyer who has a money launderer for a client may 
accept fees, which the lawyer knows or suspects to be proceeds of crime? 
It is to obviate this question and its implications that South Africa’s anti-money 
laundering (AML) legislation criminalises not only the offer by a client but also the 
acceptance by an attorney of dirty money as legal fees. The focus of the ensuing discussion 
is on the culpability of lawyers who are paid with tainted funds. It goes to the questions of 
the right of lawyers to exercise their chosen profession and the right of an accused to legal 
representation. In South Africa, these matters are governed by the Prevention of 
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Organised Crimes Act 121 of 1998 (POCA) and by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 
of 2001 (FICA). 
2 Prevention Of Organised Crime Act 
Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of POCA include AML measures that make it possible for lawyers to 
be prosecuted for accepting tainted fees.4 These sections are considered seriatim below. 
Section 2 of POCA criminalises, inter alia, the receipt, retention, use and investment of 
proceeds of racketeering by a person who was aware or reasonably ought to have been 
aware of their provenance. This offence is broad and encompasses any transaction 
involving the use or investment, directly or indirectly, of any part of the proceeds of 
racketeering in the establishment, operation or activities of any enterprise. The POCA 
definition of an enterprise includes: 
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other juristic person or legal 
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although not a juristic 
person or legal entity. 
Patently, a lawyer, as either a solo practitioner or a member of a firm, falls within this 
definition. Needless to say, if he represents an accused charged with racketeering, he can 
fall foul easily of section 2 by accepting tainted fees, since such fees invariably will be used 
or invested in the operations of his law enterprise. 
Section 4 of POCA is the key provision for the criminalisation of money laundering. It 
reads: 
Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is or forms part 
of the proceeds of unlawful activities and— 
(a) enters into any agreement or engages in any arrangement or transaction with anyone 
in connection with that property, whether such agreement, arrangement or transaction is 
legally enforceable or not; or 
(b) performs any other act in connection with such property, whether it is performed 
independently or in concert with any person, 
which has or is likely to have the effect— 
(i) of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the 
said property or the ownership thereof or any interest which anyone may have in respect 
thereof; or 
(ii) of enabling or assisting any person who has committed or commits an offence, 
whether in the Republic or elsewhere— 
(aa) to avoid prosecution; or 
(bb) to remove or diminish any property acquired directly, or indirectly, as a result of the 
commission of an offence shall be guilty of an offence. 




Essentially, a person commits money laundering by way of any agreement, arrangement 
or transaction involving proceeds of unlawful activities.5 Alternatively, a person commits 
money laundering by performing any act in relation to such proceeds which is likely to 
hide any of their attributes, or which is likely to help an offender evade justice personally 
or keep the proceeds derived from his offence out of the hands of law enforcement 
authorities.6 
The range of conduct which may constitute money laundering is extensive. It goes beyond 
transactions pertaining to criminal proceeds to encompass conduct relating to obstruction 
of justice as regards both a criminal and the proceeds of his crime. The POCA definition, it 
seems, seeks to include a comprehensive catalogue of conduct involving proceeds of 
unlawful activities. To this end it constructs a two-legged offence which traverses both 
core and cognate conduct associated with money laundering. The applicability of the 
designated categories of conduct to the attorney-client relationship needs no justification. 
The conduct element of money laundering is accompanied by a mental element in the 
form of a knowledge requirement. Indeed, section 4 of POCA commences with this 
requirement, providing that money laundering is committed by a person who knows or 
ought to have known that the property at issue is part of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities.7 Significantly, section 1(2) of POCA provides that: 
For purposes of this Act a person has knowledge of a fact if— 
(a) the person has actual knowledge of that fact; or 
(b) the court is satisfied that— 
(i) the person believes that there is a reasonable possibility of the existence of that fact; 
and 
(ii) he or she fails to obtain information to confirm the existence of that fact. 
Section 1(3) goes on to stipulate that: 
For the purposes of this Act a person ought reasonably to have known or suspected a fact 
if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would have been 
reached by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both— 
(a) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person in his or her position; and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact has. 
The statutory definition of knowledge evidently covers both intention and negligence as a 
requirement for guilt. Section 1(2) is concerned with knowledge of unlawfulness as it 
relates to intention in the form of either dolus directus8 or dolus eventualis,9 with the 
latter being founded upon wilful blindness by the person in question. Section 1(3) makes 
provision for negligence or culpa, as assessed against the standard of the reasonable 
5 Sec 4(a) of POCA, 1998. 
6 Sec 4(b) of POCA, 1998. 
7 See De Koker L (2003) “Money Laundering in South Africa” in Goredema C (ed) Profiling Money Laundering in Eastern and 
Southern Africa Pretoria: ISS Monograph Series 83-121 at 84; Van Jaarsveld (2011) at 470.
8 Sec 1(2)(a) of POCA, 1998. 
9 Sec 1(2)(b) of POCA, 1998. 
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person. Essentially, a person ought to have had knowledge of unlawfulness of a 
transaction if a reasonable person in the same position and with the same attributes 
would have known that said transaction was unlawful. Negligence derives from the 
person’s failure to meet the standard of the reasonable person.10 
Clearly, a lawyer who knows that a transaction with a client includes proceeds of crime 
and goes ahead with the transaction will be in trouble with the law. A lawyer who suspects 
that a transaction is tainted thus may be in trouble also. If he does not take reasonable 
steps to obtain further information about his suspicion, he will be deemed to have known 
that the money was acquired by illegal means. 11  The point is that the definition of 
knowledge in POCA implies that if the lawyer proceeds with a transaction involving 
tainted property, the court may find that he acted with criminal knowledge.12 In a word, 
lawyers may be prosecuted simply because their fees were paid with dirty money. 
Sections 5 and 6 of POCA apply to the conduct of a lawyer’s clients and hence, by 
necessary implication, to the conduct of the lawyer himself.13 They subsume the attorney-
client relationship if the lawyer knows or ought to have known that his client has obtained 
proceeds of unlawful activities. Section 5 reads: 
Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that another person has 
obtained the proceeds of unlawful activities, and who enters into any agreement with 
anyone or engages in any arrangement or transaction whereby— 
(a) the retention or the control by or on behalf of the said other person of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities is facilitated; or 
(b) the said proceeds of unlawful activities are used to make funds available to the said 
other person or to acquire property on his or her behalf or to benefit him or her in any 
other way, shall be guilty of an offence. 
This section is concerned with persons who act as accomplices to money launderers. 
Conventionally, accomplice liability is incurred by a person who intentionally promotes or 
facilitates the commission of a crime by another. Accomplice liability in section 5 of POCA 
is simultaneously wider and narrower than the conventional form. It is wider in that it 
includes the possibility of accomplice liability based on culpa, by providing for criminal 
knowledge of the accused person to be assessed against the standard of the reasonable 
person. It is narrower in that it is applicable only to conduct by the accomplice which 
either allows the perpetrator to retain the criminal proceeds in question or which make 
them available for use by him.14 Certainly, the possibility of a lawyer being charged as an 
accomplice to a client in a money laundering prosecution bulks large in this section. 
Section 6 of POCA similarly could implicate lawyers who receive from their clients the 
10 This would apply also to racketeering dealt with in sec 2. 
11 See Van Jaarsveld (2011) at 471. 
12 See De Koker (2003) at 85. See also Roestof v Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc ZAGPPHC 219 (2012). 
13 See Burdette (2010) at 13. 
14 See Burchell J (2016) Principles of Criminal Law (5ed) Claremont: Juta at 917. 
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proceeds of unlawful activities. It provides that: 
Any person who— 
(a) acquires; 
(b) uses; or 
(c) has possession of, 
property and who knows or ought reasonably to have known that it is or forms part of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities of another person, shall be guilty of an offence. 
As is apparent, section 6 is concerned to criminalise the receipt, possession and use by 
one person of proceeds generated by the crime of another person. As with section 5, the 
mental element of liability may be either dolus or culpa, with the former requiring real 
knowledge and the latter constructive knowledge of the criminal origins of the proceeds in 
question. In other words, one may contravene section 6 not only intentionally but also 
negligently. Negligence would arise if one fails to realise, as the reasonable person would 
have, that one was dealing with proceeds of crime. It follows that a lawyer whose fees are 
paid with dirty money could be committing a crime as soon as he receives the money from 
the client as well as when he holds it or uses it for whatever purpose. If he knew or 
suspected that the money was dirty, he contravenes section 6 with intention. Significantly, 
however, he may be guilty even if he did not harbour such knowledge or suspicion, but 
reasonably should have. 
Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of POCA are not good news for South African lawyers who represent 
persons accused of economic crimes. Such lawyers face the real risk of criminal 
prosecution for accepting, as fees, money which they knew or suspected to be tainted or, 
even worse, money which they ought to have known or suspected to be tainted. The 
possibility of incurring criminal liability on the basis of negligence is especially harsh for 
lawyers who are seeking to practise their profession by providing services to which all are 
entitled constitutionally. What is more, punishment for conviction of an offence under 
section 2, 4, 5 or 6 of POCA is serious, running to a maximum fine of R100 million or a 
prison term not exceeding 30 years.15 
3 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
FICA also creates the possibility for a lawyer to be prosecuted as a money launderer for 
accepting tainted fees. Section 1(1) defines money laundering as: 
an activity which has or is likely to have the effect of concealing or disguising the nature, 
source, location, disposition or movement of the proceeds of unlawful activities or any 
interest which anyone has in such proceeds, and includes any activity which constitutes 
an offence in terms of section 64 of this Act or section 4, 5 or 6 of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act. 
This definition incorporates by express reference sections 4, 5 and 6 of POCA. This 
incorporation means that a lawyer who accepts dirty money as fees and who then is 
15 Secs 3 & 8 of POCA, 1998. 
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alleged to have contravened any of these sections of POCA may be charged also with 
money laundering under FICA. Furthermore, the receipt of tainted legal fees in itself may 
be regarded, in terms of section 1(1) of FICA, as an activity that has the effect of 
concealing or, at least, disguising the nature, provenance or distribution of proceeds of 
crime.16 Certainly, nowhere in FICA is there any indication that a lawyer will not be 
prosecuted for being paid with dirty money. 
What is more, in terms of section 28 of FICA, an attorney is required to submit to the 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) a cash transaction report (CTR) in respect of all cash 
transactions constituting payments to and receipts from a client or his agent in excess of 
R24 999-99.17 The duty to submit a CTR seems to be founded in the belief that this 
amount of cash well could be the proceeds of illegal activity. In other words, section 28 
encapsulates a statutory suspicion that if a lawyer receives a cash fee payment of R25 000 
or more from a client, then he has been paid with tainted funds. 
The CTR clearly is meant to be an AML device. However, there is no certainty that legal 
practitioners who comply with section 28 will avoid money laundering charges for 
accepting tainted fees. Furthermore, nowadays R25 000 is hardly a huge sum and the 
duty to submit CTRs for such a low threshold may be perceived by many lawyers to be 
more trouble than it is worth. South African lawyers seem to be lodged between the 
proverbial rock and hard place when it comes to CTRs and tainted fees: they risk 
prosecution for money laundering if they accept dirty money as legal fees, whether they 
file a CTR or not. 
What is more, the legislature amended FICA in 2008 to insert section 43A. This section 
empowers the FIC or a supervisory body to issue directives to any institution or person 
governed by FICA to provide information, reports or statistical returns and to surrender 
any document. For example, a Law Society, as a supervisory body, could issue such a 
directive to attorneys. The section also authorises a Law Society to require an attorney to 
“cease or refrain from engaging in any act, omission or conduct” which contravenes FICA. 
Certainly, section 43A bristles with punitive potential and well could be deployed against 
lawyers who represent money launderers. 
Be that as it may, it is evident that, under both POCA and FICA, attorneys face indictment 
for being paid and accepting dirty money as legal fees. There is the real possibility that an 
attorney may be prosecuted for facilitating the cleaning of the money under sections 4, 5 
and 6 of POCA and under sections 1 and 28 of FICA. This circumstance has repercussions 
for lawyers themselves as well as their clients. 
4 A statutory paradox 
POCA and FICA place South African lawyers at risk of prosecution for accepting proceeds 
16 See S v Rossouw, unreported, case number B1679/09, SHD163/09, Wynberg Regional Court; S v Wei & Others, pending case 
before the Western Cape High Court.
17 Regulation 22B to FICA. See also Hamman AJ & Koen RA (2012) “Cave Pecuniam: Lawyers as Launderers” 15(5) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 69-100 at 73; Henning JJ & Ebersohn GJ (2001) “Insider Trading, Money Laundering and 
Computer Crime” 33 Transactions of the Centre for Business Law: Combating Economic Crime 105-152 at 124.
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of crime as fees. Curiously, however, POCA allows for the payment of legal fees from 
assets which have been impounded for confiscation as proceeds of crime. In other words, 
a lawyer who renders services to a client facing prosecution for economic crimes may be 
paid with money allegedly amassed from said crimes, that is, with dirty money. 
Sections 26 and 44 of POCA are relevant here.18 The former deals with restraint orders 
(ROs) against property subject to conviction based recovery proceedings, whereas the 
latter applies to property preservation orders (PPOs) against property subject to non-
conviction based recovery proceedings. Both the RO and the PPO are intended to secure 
the property for eventual confiscation. The differences between them are procedural 
rather than substantive. 
For ROs, section 26(1) of POCA provides that: 
The National Director may by way of an ex parte application apply to a competent High 
Court for an order prohibiting any person, subject to such conditions and exceptions as 
may be specified in the order, from dealing in any manner with any property to which the 
order relates. 
The possibility of legal expenses being paid from the restrained property is contained in 
section 26(6), which specifies that: 
Without derogating from the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), a 
restraint order may make such provision as the High Court may think fit— 
(a) for the reasonable living expenses of a person against whom the restraint order is 
being made and his or her family or household; and 
(b) for the reasonable legal expenses of such person in connection with any proceedings 
instituted against him or her in terms of this Chapter or any criminal proceedings to 
which such proceedings may relate, 
if the court is satisfied that the person whose expenses must be provided for has disclosed 
under oath all his or her interests in property subject to a restraint order and that the 
person cannot meet the expenses concerned out of his or her unrestrained property. 
The payment of legal expenses from property subject to a PPO is dealt with in section 44 
of POCA, which reads: 
(1) A preservation of property order may make provision as the High Court deems fit for— 
(a) reasonable living expenses of a person holding an interest in property subject to a 
preservation of property order and his or her family or household; and 
(b) reasonable legal expenses of such a person in connection with any proceedings 
instituted against him or her in terms of this Act or any other related criminal 
proceedings. 
18 See Freedman W (2012) “Constitutional Aspects” 16(1) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 445-466 at 445; Ndzengu NC 
& Von Bonde JC (2011) “Legal Expenses POCA Clauses: A Loophole to Make Crime Pay?” 24(3) South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 309-332 at 312.
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(2) A High Court shall not make provision for any expenses under subsection (1) unless it 
is satisfied that— 
(a) the person cannot meet the expenses concerned out of his or her property which is not 
subject to the preservation of property order; and 
(b) the person has disclosed under oath all his or her interests in the property and has 
submitted to that Court a sworn and full statement of all his or her assets and liabilities. 
It is evident that sections 26(6) and 44 are near facsimiles of each other. Both require that 
the legal expenses be reasonable, and that the defendant be unable to pay them from his 
unrestrained or unpreserved property. The key difference is that whereas section 26(6) 
requires from the defendant full disclosure of all his interests in the restrained property, 
section 44 demands full disclosure of all his interests in the preserved property as well as 
full disclosure of all his assets and liabilities. This difference likely has its source in the 
nature of the proceedings at issue: presumably, the release of legal expenses in non-
conviction based recovery proceedings, because such proceedings are in rem and not 
connected to any criminal prosecution, needs to be based upon a comprehensive 
proprietary profile of the defendant who is intervening in the proceedings. In any event, 
whether the proceedings are conviction based or not, the power to order payment of legal 
expenses from restrained or preserved property is within the bailiwick of the court seized 
of the proceedings. 
The point is that sections 26(6) and 44 of POCA appear to confound the trend inscribed in 
sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of POCA and section 1 of FICA regarding dirty money as legal fees. 
On the one hand, lawyers representing clients accused of money laundering and other 
economic offences stand in peril of prosecution, conviction and punishment for accepting 
or receiving proceeds of crime as fees. On the other hand, the self-same lawyers may be 
paid, with the leave of the court, from the self-same proceeds of crime. This apparent 
statutory contradiction requires some comment. 
The role of the court seems to be crucial. In both sections 26(6) and 44, the legislature 
expressly premises the release of legal expenses upon a court directive as an element of a 
RO or PPO. The property from which the legal expenses may be paid must be property 
subject to recovery proceedings, either in personam or in rem, before the court 
authorising the payment. The quantum of the fees must be reasonable in relation, 
presumably, to the nature of the proceedings. And the decision to allow the payment of 
reasonable legal expenses remains discretionary, even if the defendant meets the criteria 
stipulated in either section. Ultimately, it is the court which elects to release legal 
expenses from property alleged to be proceeds of crime. 
It would appear, then, that the paradox of contemporaneous criminalisation and 
authorisation of dirty money as legal fees dissipates, and POCA remains coherent, if the 
latter is understood as an exception to the former. In other words, lawyers cannot accept 
dirty money as legal fees unless authorised to do so by the court dealing with recovery 
proceedings relating to the dirty money. This understanding implies that lawyers who 
receive or accept dirty money in circumstances which fall outside the ambit of section 
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26(6) or 44 continue to face prosecution and conviction under sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of 
POCA and section 1 of FICA. Thus, the hazards facing lawyers who represent clients 
accused of economic crimes continue to bulk large, notwithstanding the concessions 
contained in sections 26(6) and 44 of POCA. These concessions are exceptions to the rule. 
The rule is that it is illegal for lawyers to be paid with dirty money, and lawyers who 
accept such money as fees commit an offence.19 
5 Tainted fees in comparative perspective 
The question of tainted fees is not a peculiarly South African issue. It matters to lawyers 
anywhere who represent money launderers. In a globalised world, a consideration of how 
other countries deal with the question will serve to bring the South African response into 
sharp relief. To this end, reference will be had below to the positions in the USA and 
Canada. Unlike South Africa, the AML legislation pertaining to tainted fees in these 
countries has been tested vigorously in their courts, and with considerable success for the 
legal profession. The experience of the USA and Canada thus could constitute an 
invaluable resource for comprehending the rights and wrongs of the South African 
situation.20 
5.1 The US position 
The question of dirty money as legal fees falls under the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986 (MLCA). The MLCA consists of two sections from Title 18 of the United States Code, 
namely, 18 USC §1956 and 18 USC §1957. The latter section applies here. 
The MCLA contains an offence regarding monetary transactions involving property 
derived from unlawful activity. Specifically, §1957(a) provides that: 
Whoever … knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified 
unlawful activity, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
Originally, the key notion of a “monetary transaction” was defined in §1957(f)(1) as: 
the deposit, withdrawal, transfer or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined for the purposes of subchapter 
II of chapter 53 of title 31) by, through, or to a financial institution (as defined in §5312 of 
title 31). 
This is a wide definition, encompassing all transactions that one can perform in or via 
banks or other financial institutions.21 It accords with the purpose of §1957 to keep dirty 
money out of financial institutions. 22  The section criminalises the mere receipt or 
disbursement of more than $10 000 in a monetary transaction involving proceeds of 
crime. Certainly, the deposit of legal fees into a lawyer’s bank account, by the client or the 
19 See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC). 
20 It bears noting that section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution authorises national courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to 
consider foreign law. 
21 See Madinger J (2012) Money Laundering: A Guide for Criminal Investigators New York: CRC Press at 34; Jacobs A (1989) 
“Indirect Deprivation of the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Prospective Prosecution of Criminal Defence Attorneys for 
Money Laundering” 34 New York Law School Review 304-348 at 311.
22 See Irvine & King (1988) at 183; Madinger (2012) at 34. 
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lawyer himself, could qualify as a monetary transaction, and if that deposit comprised 
criminal proceeds in excess of $10 000, the lawyer was punishable under §1957. 
It is required that the person engaging or attempting to engage in the proscribed 
monetary transaction know that the funds were generated from a specific unlawful 
activity.23 However, that is small comfort for lawyers who have money launderers for 
clients, given that they likely know that they will be paid with tainted funds. What is more, 
the state does not have to prove any criminal intention on the part of the lawyer.24 It 
merely has to prove that the lawyer knew that the funds were tainted and paid by his 
client in a monetary transaction. Further, a prosecution under §1957 may take place only 
where the sum at issue exceeds $10 000. By implication, the acceptance of an amount 
below $10 000 is not punishable under §1957. However, this is a relatively modest 
threshold, which many lawyers representing money launderers are unlikely to meet. 
All in all, §1957, in its original incarnation, put lawyers in jeopardy of criminal liability for 
accepting tainted fees. The maximum sentence for a violation of §1957 is a fine of $250 
000 or 10 years’ imprisonment or both.25 Instead of the prescribed fine, the court may 
impose a maximum a fine of twice the amount of the criminal proceeds involved in the 
transaction.26 The penalty provisions of §1957 were novel in 1986. It was the first time 
that heavy sanctions could be imposed on persons who knowingly provide services and 
goods in exchange for dirty money, without having the intention to promote the original 
criminal activity.27 
Lawyers in the US were alive to the risks posed to them by §1957. They understood that by 
practising their profession, they faced criminal conviction if the state could prove that 
they were implicated in some form of monetary transaction involving criminal proceeds 
in excess of $10 000.28 They were aware, too, that the original §1957 extended to criminal 
lawyers who deposit fees knowing that their clients have generated the money from 
crime.29 The US legal fraternity was not prepared to accept this situation docilely and 
raised numerous objections to §1957, arguing primarily from the right to legal 
representation entrenched in the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution. 
This criticism was potent enough to secure an amendment to the definition of a monetary 
transaction in 1988.30 The amended §1957(f)(1) now says: 
the term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in 
23 See Madinger (2012) at 34; Gaetke E & Welling S (1992) “Money Laundering and Lawyers” 43 Syracuse Law Review 1165-
1245 at 1168.
24 See Richards J (1999) Transnational Criminal Organisations, Cybercrime and Money Laundering Boca Raton: CRC Press at 
140; Shams H (2004) Legal Globalisation: Money Laundering Law and Other Cases British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law at 31.
25 §1957(b)(1) of the MLCA, 1986. 
26 §1957(b)(2) of the MLCA, 1986. 
27 See Gaetke & Welling (1992) at 1170; Shams (2004) at 31. 
28 See Irvine & King (1988) at 185; Brickey K (1988) “Tainted Assets and the Right to Counsel—the Money Laundering 
Conundrum” 66 Washington University Law Quarterly 47-66 at 48.
29 See Gaetke & Welling (1992) at 1168; Irvine & King (1988) at 185. 
30 See Gaetke & Welling (1992) at 1168; Nelson M (2009) “Federal Forfeiture and Money Laundering: Undue Deference to Legal 
Fictions and the Canadian Crossroads” 41(1) Miami Inter American Law Review 43-104 at 51.
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or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as 
defined in §1956(c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial institution (as defined in 
§1956 of this title), including any transaction that would be a financial transaction under
§1956(c)(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any transaction necessary to
preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the 
Constitution.31 
This amendment means, basically, that any transaction involving legal fees attendant 
upon upholding the right to legal representation is not a monetary transaction, and hence 
is exempted from criminalisation. It represents a quite significant victory for the US legal 
profession, especially for the criminal bar. Lawyers no longer risk prosecution should they 
accept tainted fees,32 even if they become aware of the unlawful provenance of said fees in 
their dealings with or on behalf of their clients.33 
Obviously, criminals or lawyers should not be allowed to abuse this exemption by using 
the payment of unnecessarily high fees as a laundering technique.34 In such cases, both 
lawyer and client deserve to be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.35 However, in all 
cases of bona fide legal representation upholding the right to counsel, the 1988 
amendment means that a US lawyer ought not to be prosecuted merely for being paid 
with tainted funds. 
Regrettably, even the express exemption in §1957 is no guarantee against prosecution. 
That the sword of Damocles continues to hang over the heads of lawyers was illustrated 
amply in the case of United States v Velez,36 which came before the US courts two decades 
after the 1988 amendment. It concerned the 2008 indictment of attorney Ben Kuehne on 
money laundering charges.37 
A former Medellin drug lord, Fabio Ochoa-Vasquez, had been extradited to the US in 
2001 to stand trial for conspiring to smuggle to the US about thirty tons of cocaine per 
month between 1997 and 1999.38 He was convicted in 2003. Kuehne was engaged in 2001 
by Roy Black, Ochoa-Vasquez’s American lawyer, to determine whether the money Black 
was receiving from his client as fees was clean.39 Kuehne had two co-accused: Gloria 
Florez Velez, Ochoa-Vasquez’s former accountant; and Oscar Saldarriaga Ochoa, his 
Colombian attorney. Together they drafted six opinions, each of which pronounced 
untainted the fee source to which it related.40 Between January 2002 and April 2003, 
31 Emphasis added. See also Gaetke & Welling (1992) at 1168; Nelson (2009) at 51. 
32 See Jacobs (1989) at 314. 
33 See Gaetke & Welling (1992) at 1172; Nelson (2009) at 51. 
34 See Nelson (2009) at 51; Weinstein AK (1998) “Prosecuting Attorneys for Money Laundering: a New and Questionable Weapon 
in the War on Crime” 51(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 369-386 at 374.
35 §1956 of the MLCA, 1986 allows for the prosecution of lawyers who receive a tarnished fee payment, knowing that it derives 
from a crime, and who conceal its criminal origin.
36 United States v Velez Case No 05-20770-Cr-Cook (2008) and United States v Velez F 3d 875 (11th Cir 2009). 
37 See Healy NM et al (2009) “US and International Anti-Money Laundering Developments” The International Lawyer 795-809 at 
807; Slater D (20 November 2008) “Scales of Justice: The Right to Counsel vs the Need to Bar Tainted Legal Fees” The Wall Street 
Journal at 1.
38 See Healy et al (2009) at 807; Nelson (2009) at 56; Podgor ES (2010) “Regulating Lawyers: Same Theme, New Context” 
Journal of the Professional Lawyer 191-220 at 196.
39 See Nelson (2009) at 57; Healy et al (2009) at 807. 
40 See Podgor (2010) at 195; Healy et al (2009) at 807. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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Ochoa-Vasquez’s relatives deposited a total of $5 289 762-67 into Kuehne’s trust account. 
Kuehne disbursed all the funds (except some $50 000 withheld as a retainer) to Ochoa-
Vasquez’s lawyers. He was paid $197 300 for his work in vetting the fees. 
Kuehne was charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to violate §1957 of the MLCA. It was 
alleged that Kuehne and his co-accused falsified documents and facilitated a series of wire 
transfers to the US via the Black Market Peso Exchange, whilst knowing that the funds 
were the proceeds of drug trafficking. They argued that they were protected by the Sixth 
Amendment exemption and applied for the charge under §1957 to be dismissed. District 
Judge Cooke granted Kuehne's motion of dismissal. The state appealed,41 arguing that the 
exemption in §1957(f)(1) had been nullified by a Supreme Court ruling42 that the Sixth 
Amendment does not protect the right to counsel where an accused used criminal 
proceeds for legal fees. Kuehne and his co-accused insisted that they were protected by 
this exemption and that the charge under §1957 could not stand. Kuehne argued further 
that he did not know that the funds in question were tainted. 
The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Kuehne and his co-accused,43 agreeing with Judge 
Cooke that Kuehne could not be prosecuted because the funds were for legitimate legal 
services.44 It held that the plain language of §1957(f)(1) exempts criminal proceeds used to 
secure Sixth Amendment legal representation.45 The state then dismissed the case against 
Kuehne.46 
This was the first indictment under the federal AML statutes of an attorney for 
performing due diligence on another lawyer's legal fees. The indictment of Kuehne, a 
renowned lawyer respected by his colleagues, shocked the US legal community. Although 
cleared, Kuehne had been under indictment for two years and had to cope with the 
stresses and expense of defending himself. He had been charged even though Ochoa-
Vasquez was not his client. He had been hired by Ochoa-Vasquez’s lawyers only to 
ascertain whether they were being paid with dirty money, and he was indicted even 
though he had verified that the money was clean. He had been charged under §1957 even 
though it exempts attorneys from prosecution who are paid with tainted money when 
upholding a client’s constitutional right to legal representation. The point is that, like 
Kuehne, all attorneys face a plurality of perils in exercising their professional 
responsibilities. They become ready targets of zealous prosecution if they allow a 
suspicion to arise that, in order to secure their fees, they are prepared to open the gate to 
the money laundering process. 
5.2 The Canadian position 
Canada criminalised money laundering in 1989 in section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code. 
The provision stipulates that: 
41 United States v Velez F 3d 875 (11th Cir 2009) at 5.  
42 Caplin & Drysdale v United States 491 US 617 (1989) at 617 & 626. 
43 See Podgor (2010) at 196. See also United States v Velez F 3d 875 (11th Cir 2009) at 9. 
44 United States v Velez F 3d 875 (11th Cir 2009) at 9. 
45 United States v Velez F 3d 875 (11th Cir 2009) at 9. 
46 See Government Motion to Dismiss Third Superseding Indictment with Prejudice, United States v Kuehne and Ochoa Case No 
05-20770-Cr-Cook (2009).
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Everyone commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to 
any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in 
any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any property with intent 
to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a 
part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as 
a result of 
(a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or 
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted 
a designated offence.47 
Money laundering is committed in respect of a “designated offence”, which is defined as: 
(a) any offence that may be prosecuted as an indictable offence under this or any other 
Act of Parliament, other than an indictable offence prescribed by regulation, or 
(b) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in relation to, 
or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph a.48 
The definition of money laundering contained in the Criminal Code has been 
incorporated by express reference into the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and 
Terrorist Financing Act of 2000 (PCMLTFA). Thus, section 2 of the PCMLTFA provides 
that a “money laundering offence means an offence under subsection 462.31(1) of the 
Criminal Code”. 
In Canada, then, a person commits money laundering by dealing with tainted property or 
its proceeds, in any way and by any means, with the intention of concealing or converting 
said property or proceeds, and in the knowledge or belief that it derives from an illegal 
source. 49  The maximum punishment for a person convicted of money laundering is 
imprisonment for ten years.50 
Theoretically, Canadian lawyers who accept dirty money as legal fees may fall foul of the 
Criminal Code or the PCMLTFA.51 They risk prosecution if they knowingly accept, use or 
otherwise transact with tainted fees, “with intent to conceal or convert” them, thereby to 
mask their criminal derivation. This last point is pivotal when it comes to tainted fees. 
Section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code requires an intention to launder on the part of the 
person dealing with the property or proceeds in question. Thus, a lawyer not only should 
know or believe that his fees are being paid with dirty money, but also should accept the 
dirty money with the intention of laundering it by concealment or conversion. In other 
47 See also Murphy D (2000) “Canada’s Anti-Money Laundering Regime” 58 Resource Material Series 117th International 
Seminar Visiting Experts’ Papers 286-302 at 286; Murphy D (2004) “Canada’s Laws on Money Laundering Proceeds of Crime: 
The International Context” Asper Review 63-84 at 65; Kroeker R (1995) “The Legal and Ethical Propriety of Allowing Accused to 
Use the Proceeds of Crime to Retain Counsel” 53(6) The Advocate 865-878 at 865.
48 Sec 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code, 1985. 
49 See Brucker TM (1997) “Money Laundering and the client: How can I be retained without becoming a party to an offence?” 
55(5) The Advocate 679-692 at 680; Wilbern C (2008) Assessing the Opinion of Lawyers of Canadian Money Laundering 
legislation Unpublished PhD thesis: North Central University at 18.
50 Sec 462.31(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, 1985. See also Wilbern (2008) at 18. 
51 See Schneider (2006) at 65; Wilbern (2008) at 18 & 24-28. 
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words, the acceptance by a Canadian lawyer of tainted fees likely will amount to a crime 
only if the lawyer is part of a joint criminal enterprise with the client to use the payment 
of legal fees as a means of washing the client’s dirty money. If the lawyer is not party to 
such a scheme, then his receiving dirty money as legal fees and transacting with it does 
not contravene section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code, even if he knew or suspected that 
the money was dirty. 
 
Canadian AML law thus does not criminalise tainted fees, except when the lawyer is 
motivated by an intention to launder. Absent such intention, it appears that Canadian 
lawyers may accept tainted fees with impunity. Their knowing or believing that the fees 
are proceeds of crime does not render their dealings unlawful. What is more, it is 
apparent that section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code cannot be contravened negligently. 
In a word, to be guilty of money laundering, the lawyer who is paid with dirty money must 
intend to camouflage its criminal origins in some way. To be sure, the lawyer who is party 
to a fee laundering scam is a money launderer and needs to be prosecuted as such. 
However, the lawyer who is paid with dirty money while providing bona fide legal services 
in the course of practising his profession is not a money launderer and thus beyond the 
reach of section 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code, even if he is certain that the money is 
dirty. 
 
This understanding of the position in Canada may be extrapolated from the response of 
the organised legal profession to the enactment of the PCMLTFA in 2000 and its 
accompanying Regulations in November 2001.52 The profession was decidedly unhappy 
and launched litigation with a view to exempting lawyers from the force of the PCMLTFA 
and its Regulations.53 Significantly, the court challenges did not mention the question of 
tainted fees as a crime. The primary issues were whether the AML legislation threatened 
the independence of the bar and attorney-client confidentiality, and whether it created a 
conflict between lawyers' duties to their clients and their obligation to report confidential 
information to the government.54 The litigation offensive by the legal profession spanned 
15 years and was eminently successful, but in none of the series of cases brought before 
the Canadian courts was the criminalisation of tainted fees in dispute. 55  It may be 
concluded that both the profession and the government understand and accept that in 
Canada it is not a crime for a lawyer to be paid with dirty money. 
 
Further, not only does Canadian AML law not criminalise tainted fees, but it also allows 
for the payment of reasonable legal expenses from property which allegedly is proceeds of 
crime. This is possible in terms of section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, which 
empowers a judge, upon application, to return seized property or to release restrained 
property to the applicant for the purpose of meeting his reasonable legal expenses. The 
                                                 
52 See Macdonald R (2010) “Money Laundering Regulation—What can be learned from the Canadian Experience?” Journal of the 
Professional Lawyer 143-150 at 144; Gallant M (2009) “Uncertainties Collide: Lawyers and Money Laundering, Terrorist Finance 
Regulations” 16(3) Journal of Economic Crimes 210-219 at 211. 
53 See Terry LS (2010) “An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and its 2008 Lawyer Guidance” Journal of the 
Professional Lawyer 3-67 at 3 & 34. 
54 See Gallant (2009) at 211; Macdonald (2010) at 144. 
55 See Law Society of British Columbia v Canada 2001 BCSC 1593; Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2011 
(BCSC) 1270; Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada 2013 (BCCA) 147; Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada 2015 SCC 7. 
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application under section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) entails a two-stage enquiry: firstly, is the 
accused entitled to the release of a portion of the seized or restrained property as legal 
fees; and, secondly, are said legal expenses reasonable?56 
 
If the enquiry establishes that the applicant qualifies for assistance and that the quantum 
being sought is reasonable, the court will order the return or release of property under 
seizure or restraint so that he is able to pay for legal counsel. The property in question 
well may be proceeds of crime. However, it would seem that the applicant’s right to legal 
representation trumps any recovery proceedings to which the property may be subject. In 
Canada, then, lawyers may be paid freely with dirty money which is in the hands of their 
clients and they may be paid at the behest of the court with dirty money which is under 
seizure or restraint. In sum, the fact that money is dirty is no bar to its being used by a 
client to settle his lawyer’s fee account. 
 
At this juncture, reference to the case of Gagnon is apposite.57 The accused was charged 
with trafficking in cocaine and possession of stolen property. The property in question 
was a log skidder, which Gagnon needed for a logging contract. He earned $1 500 from 
the contract which he used to pay his bail on the possession charge. Later, he signed over 
the bail bond of $1 500 as fees to his lawyer. Gagnon was convicted on both the trafficking 
and possession counts, for which he received prison sentences of five years and nine 
months respectively. He had agreed that assets worth $130 000 be forfeited on the 
trafficking charge. The state then sought to seize the $1 500 as proceeds of crime on the 
possession charge or for a fine of $1 500 be imposed in lieu of forfeiture.58 
 
The Court denied the seizure motion, holding that the $1 500 already had been assigned 
irrevocably to Gagnon’s lawyer, and that even if the state had seized it before its 
assignment, Gagnon could have applied under Section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal 
Code for its release as legal expenses. The court found that Gagnon could have been fined 
instead but decided not to do so, noting that he probably would have succeeded with a 
section 462.34(4)(c)(ii) application and that the fees of lawyers who act as defence 
counsel ought not to be at risk of forfeiture.59 
 
Gagnon drew conceptual connections between legal fees, the right to legal representation 
and the right of lawyers to practise their profession. Thus, the court characterised lawyers’ 
fees as a “special type of expenditure linked to a constitutionally protected right”.60 
Entrained in the right to counsel is counsel’s right to be remunerated. The spectre of fee 
forfeiture prompted the court to ask: 
 
What lawyer would undertake the defence of an accused person if fees paid by the accused 
could eventually be recovered by the state?61 
 
                                                 
56 See R v Lortie (1985) 21 CCC (3d) 436; R v Clymore (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 217 (BCSC); Brucker (1997) at 680-681. 
57 R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 508. 
58 This is possible under section 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code, 1985. See R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 508 para 8. 
59 R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 508 para 19. 
60 R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 508 para 19. 
61 R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 508 para 22. 
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However, the court noted also that reluctance or refusal by lawyers to represent accused 
who pay with dirty money, although understandable, jeopardises the right of such an 
accused to competent representation: 
 
What accused would then have the benefit of the constitutional right to a full defence, 
given the dual problems of finding a lawyer who will act under those conditions and of 
serving time in addition to the sentence imposed for the substantive crime if the lawyers’ 
fees are repaid to the state as proceeds of crime?62 
 
Clearly, the implementation of the right to legal representation is contingent upon lawyers 
being paid to practise their profession. This is an interdependent configuration which 
implodes if the lawyer is not paid for the work he performs in defending the accused. The 
court in Gagnon understood that the “constitutional right to a full defence” remains at 
risk unless and until legal fees are free from the risk of forfeiture for being dirty money. 
 
All in all, Canada has no especial truck with dirty money being used by an accused to pay 
for bona fide and reasonable legal expenses. Canadian jurisprudence in this area is 
concerned primarily with securing and preserving the right to counsel. Hence, it is not a 
crime for a lawyer to accept tainted fees, unless the payment is part of a money laundering 
scheme between client and lawyer. What is more, provision has been made in the 
Criminal Code for legal expenses to be paid from dirty money which has been impounded. 
In Canada, the interests of the state and of society in prosecuting and punishing economic 
crime are superseded by the constitutional rights of the accused and his lawyer. 
 
5.3 Comparative summation 
South Africa, the US and Canada all introduced AML legislation as part of their 
international obligations. The key South African statutes, POCA and FICA, both 
criminalise tainted legal fees. A South African lawyer who knows or reasonably ought to 
have known that a client is paying him with dirty money stands to be prosecuted as a 
money launderer. The only relief lies in the POCA provisions empowering the High Court 
to order payment of reasonable legal expenses from property under restraint or 
preservation as proceeds of crime. South African AML legislation does not countenance 
lawyers being paid with dirty money in any other circumstances. 
 
Initially, the US also criminalised tainted legal fees. The prohibition in the MLCA on 
monetary transactions involving proceeds of crime meant that lawyers whose fees 
exceeded $10 000 would incur criminal liability if they were paid with dirty money. 
However, the US legal profession secured an amendment to the MLCA which excluded 
from the meaning of a monetary transaction all dealings necessary to uphold the right to 
legal representation. Effectively, the amendment decriminalised tainted fees. Thus, it is 
quite legal for US lawyers to be paid with dirty money in giving effect to a client’s right to 
counsel. 
 
Canada, it appears, never did criminalise tainted fees. An intention to launder is an 
                                                 
62 R v Gagnon 10 (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 508 para 22. 
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element of the money laundering offence in the Criminal Code and the PCMLTFA. The 
lawyer who accepts dirty money as legal fees must do so, inter alia, with intent to conceal 
or convert the criminal provenance of said money. This requirement means that tainted 
fees are problematic only if they form part of a money laundering stratagem. Certainly, 
lawyers who entertain no such intent may accept tainted fees without fear of prosecution. 
As in South Africa, the Canadian Criminal Code allows for the payment of reasonable legal 
expenses from seized or restrained proceeds of crime. 
 
Comparatively, South African lawyers are worst off. Unlike their US and Canadian 
counterparts, they run the real risk of being branded money launderers by representing 
clients who pay with dirty money. In South Africa, there is no exemption for legal fees as 
there is in the US. And the South African lawyer who is paid with tainted fees does not 
need an intention to launder, as in Canada. It is possible even for a South African lawyer 
to become a money launderer negligently! 
 
The lot of South African lawyers is illustrated well by the case of Wei, concerning an 
abalone poaching syndicate.63 It involves 30 accused and 590 charges. One of the accused 
is Anthony Broadway, a defence attorney, who had represented a number of his co-
accused in the past. It is alleged that he received various sums of cash as fees from them, 
while being aware that they did not have legal income to pay his fees.64 He is the first 
attorney in South Africa to be indicted for receiving tainted fees. 
 
Bellville attorney Anthony Broadway … who represented several syndicate members since 
2001, was also a defendant in the restraint proceedings. His assets, listed on an annexure 
to the order, include properties in Kenridge and Bellville, a Mercedes-Benz, a Hyundai 
i20, a trailer, two motorcycles and the contents of nine bank accounts in his name. His 
wife, Helena, who lives in Kent in the UK, has been cited as a respondent, as was close 
corporation Royal Albatross Investments.65 
 
Broadway has been charged with contravening section 2 of POCA for receiving or 
retaining property which he knew to be derived from racketeering.66 He has been charged 
also with money laundering and offences relating to proceeds of unlawful activity under 
sections 4, 5 and 6 of POCA, as well as with failing to comply with the provisions of FICA 
and to register with the FIC.67 Other money laundering charges relate to the retrieval of 
money invested on behalf of one Frank Barends with a financial broker; R1 500 000 paid 
into Broadway’s trust account for the benefit of Barends;68 R425 058 paid from his trust 
account into the business account of Royal Albatross Investment 142 CC;69 a cheque of 
R90 000 payable to and cashed by him;70 and R600 474-76 paid directly into his personal 
savings account.71 It is not clear from the indictment, but all these amounts presumably 
                                                 
63 S v Wei & Others, pending case, Western Cape High Court. 
64 S v Wei Summary of facts Para E 27. 
65 Schroeder F (2103) “Abalone syndicate set to lose millions”, available at http://www.iol.co.za (visited 27 April 2017). 
66 S v Wei Para F3. 
67 S v Wei Summary of Facts Para G 51, Count 566. 
68 S v Wei Para G 52, Count 567. 
69 S v Wei Counts 519 & 425. 
70 S v Wei Para G 53, Count 573. 
71 S v Wei Para G 53, Count 574. 
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are criminal proceeds which supposedly were laundered by Broadway. 
 
He has been charged also with failure to submit STRs and CTRs to the FIC.72 One of the 
counts alleges that Barends lent more than R1 000 000 to one Johan Van der Berg and 
that Broadway, after he had requested the money via a letter of demand, facilitated the 
sale of a house, owned by Van der Berg’s wife, to Barends at a reduced price.73 This 
allegedly was a property scam to launder the R1 000 000. 
 
The facts of Wei are messy and the issues are difficult to disentangle. And there does not 
appear to have been any real progress in the case since Broadway was indicted in 2013. 
However, the case removes all doubt about the criminalisation of tainted fees under 
POCA and FICA. It stands as an exemplar of the precarious position of South African 
lawyers representing clients who profit from criminal conduct. Like Broadway, they 
hazard being thrust onto the wrong side of the law if they are paid with dirty money. Of 
course, any offensive against dirty money ought to be welcomed. However, given the 
constitution of South African AML legislation, there is the real possibility that a 
crackdown on dirty money could result in a crackdown also on lawyers who represent the 
purveyors of dirty money. 74  Anthony Broadway could be the first of many defence 
attorneys who find themselves in the dock, accused of laundering money for accepting 
tainted fees. 
 
6 Tainted fees and the right to legal representation 
Like all accused, the person charged with money laundering is entitled to be defended by 
a lawyer. The right to legal representation is guaranteed universally, more or less. In 
South Africa, it is entrenched in section 35(3)(f) of the Constitution, as part of the fair 
trial rights of every accused person. 
 
The question of tainted legal fees is linked intimately to the right to legal representation. 
In the US, §1957 of the MLCA was amended to secure this right, leading to the 
decriminalisation of tainted fees. Indeed, the case against Ben Kuehne collapsed because 
of this amendment. In Canada, tainted fees never have been criminalised and hence never 
have obstructed the right to counsel. In Gagnon, the court expressly linked legal fees to 
the protection of the “constitutional right to a full defence”. Certainly, Canadian lawyers 
do not face the peril of prosecution if they are paid with dirty money for effectuating a 
client’s right to legal representation. 
 
By contrast, South African defence lawyers are saddled with an intractable situation. They 
have an ethical and constitutional duty to represent accused persons, including those 
charged with money laundering. Yet, if they are paid with money which they know or 
suspect to be dirty, they themselves face the prospect of being charged with money 
laundering. And the prospect is not a theoretical one, as the prosecution of Anthony 
Broadway attests. 
 
                                                 
72 S v Wei Para G 54 and G 58. 
73 S v Wei Para G 55. 
74 Hawkey K (2011) “FICA and jurisdiction over acting judges on the agenda at FSLS AGM” De Rebus at 9. 
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Lawyers are essential to ensuring that the fair trial rights of an accused person are 
respected by the police, the prosecution and the courts. By criminalising tainted fees, 
South Africa’s AML statutes have endangered the constitutional right to legal 
representation. Preventing lawyers from accepting tainted fees could prompt them to 
refuse to defend persons indicted for money laundering, thereby violating the right to 
counsel.75 What is more, even if a lawyer declines a brief for fear of being paid with dirty 
money, he is required to report the matter to the FIU.76 
 
Defence attorneys are in the singular, if not unique, position of securing a crucial 
constitutional right simply by practising their chosen profession. Thus, South Africa’s 
criminalisation of tainted fees well may decried as unconstitutional for being an 
unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation upon the fundamental right to legal 
representation.77 Be that as it may, such unconstitutionality is unquestionably immanent 
in the offending sections of POCA and FICA. The menace of their nullifying the right to 
legal representation by menacing defence attorneys with prosecution is serious. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the right of South African criminal lawyers to practise 
their profession has been compromised by the AML legislation. Relative to their US and 
Canadian colleagues, then, South African lawyers are in a no-win position as regards 
tainted fees. 
 
A key consideration here is the response of the organised profession to the AML 
legislation. The US and Canadian legal professions reacted vigorously, by voicing their 
opposition to the repugnant aspects. This campaign of discontent ensured that US and 
Canadian attorneys would not risk prosecution for representing clients who paid their 
fees with contaminated funds. Regrettably, South Africa’s legal profession did not register 
any serious or sustained concern about the sections of POCA and FICA which exposed its 
members to prosecution for accepting tainted fees. Certainly, the Law Societies of South 
Africa (LSSA) did not spearhead a campaign to lobby for appropriate amendments to the 
AML legislation. In particular, no efforts were made by the organised profession to 
challenge the objectionable provisions in court. 
 
The apparent lassitude of the LSSA notwithstanding, it is evident that the South African 
legislature hardly spared a thought for the issue of tainted fees when it enacted the AML 
statutes. Whilst legislative attempts to curb economic crime are necessary, FICA and 
POCA entail potentially ruinous consequences for lawyers by their criminalisation of 
tainted fees. The current asymmetry between the statutory AML imperatives and the 
constitutional right to legal representation victimises lawyers whose fees are paid with 
dirty money. This is a situation which the organised profession ought not to tolerate 
indefinitely. Indeed, it cries out to be righted. In a word, South African AML law needs to 
be amended in order to balance the state’s interest in combating money laundering, 
including the lawyer-facilitated version, with the lawyer’s right to practise his profession 
and the accused’s right to legal representation. 
 
                                                 
75 See Bussenius (2004) at 30. 
76 Sec 29(2) of FICA, 2001. 
77 A full discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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Of course, if lawyers assist their clients in money laundering schemes, they must be 
prosecuted. However, it should not be a crime for a lawyer merely to accept tainted fees, if 
the payment is to give effect to an accused person’s right to legal representation. In such a 
case, an exemption from prosecution ought to be granted. The point is that combating 
crime ought not to infringe fundamental rights. And in unthinkingly criminalising tainted 
fees, the South African legislature showed but little regard for the basic right to legal 
representation and the right of legal professionals to practise law. 
 
7 Conclusion 
US and Canadian law does not support South Africa’s criminalisation of tainted fees. It is 
submitted, therefore, that tainted fees be decriminalised and that POCA and FICA be 
amended accordingly. An exemption similar to that contained in §1957 of the MLCA 
should be incorporated into the South African AML legislation. If no such exemption is 
allowed, lawyers could begin treating certain accused persons as untouchables, thereby 
violating their fundamental right to legal representation. Why the South African 
organised legal profession failed to defend its members against the assault implicit in the 
culpable provisions of POCA and FICA remains a mystery. However, now is the time for 
the LSSA to become activist and campaign for the decriminalisation of tainted fees. 
Certainly, there is no policy or moral justification for the status quo and it ought to be 
reversed sooner rather than later. 
 
Regrettably, lawyers cannot rely upon the perspicacity or goodwill of the legislature to 
look after their interests. They need to take responsibility for their own professional well-
being and lobby for amendment of the AML statutes. Perhaps the LSSA ought to test the 
constitutionality of the legislation in court.  Perhaps it should consider intervening in the 
Wei case to stop the prosecution of Anthony Broadway on the charge(s) related to tainted 
fees. Criminal lawyers in the US and Canada are not as assailable as their South African 
counterparts precisely because their professional organisations responded robustly to the 
threats inscribed in their AML legislation. The South African profession needs to follow 
suit. If nothing is done, the surreal situation could arise where a South African lawyer who 
provided legal representation to money launderers finds himself in the dock on money 
laundering charges without legal representation! 
 
